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ABSTRACT 
I argue that reliance on political testimony conflicts with two democratic values: the value of 
mutual justifiability and the value of equality of opportunity for political influence. Reliance on 
political testimony is characterized by a reliance on the assertions of others directly on a political 
question the citizen is asked to answer as part of a formal democratic decision procedure. Reliance 
on expert testimony generally, even in the context of political decision-making, does not similarly 
conflict with democratic values. As a consequence of the argument, citizens have pro tanto reason 
to rely on their own political judgment when determining their vote, and democratic societies have 
reason to only ask citizens questions they are able to answer without reliance on political 
testimony.  
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1. Introduction 
On June 23, 2016 the British people had the opportunity to vote in the United Kingdom European 
Union membership referendum. I wasn’t allowed to vote in the referendum, but imagine I was. 
Consider the following scenario: 
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 Expert Testimony: before I vote, I seek out the judgment of legal scholars, economists,  
 immigration experts, historians, political scientists, and so on, about the likely effects of  
 the UK leaving compared to remaining in the EU. Based on this information, I make up  
 my mind about whether it would be better to remain or leave and vote accordingly.  
It seems that in this scenario, I’m an admirable participant in the referendum. In particular, it seems 
that I make appropriate use of expert testimony. Of course, there are plenty of questions about who 
should count as a genuine expert in any of these domains, and about what would count as a good 
reason for me to believe that various people are genuine experts. Yet, there does not seem to be 
anything wrong in general with using expert testimony in this way. Compare this to the next 
scenario: 
 Political Testimony: before I vote, I seek out a number of people who I know to be very  
 well informed about European politics in general, who have extensive knowledge of the  
 likely effects of leaving compared to remaining, and who I believe  have good judgment  
 in political matters. I ask them whether leaving is better than remaining. Based on their  
 answers, I make up my mind about whether it would be better to leave or remain, and  
 vote accordingly. 
In the first scenario, my judgment and decision-making about a political issue are informed by the 
testimony of others concerning a range of relevant considerations; in the second scenario, my 
judgment and decision-making are informed by other people’s testimony directly on the political 
issue at hand. Some people believe that my use of the judgments of others in the second scenario 
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is problematic in a way that my use of expert testimony in the first scenario is not.1 This article is 
concerned with whether this belief is correct. More precisely, my question is whether there is 
something problematic about what I will call political testimony, in the context of a democratic 
political society.  
 The importance of this question is underscored by two findings from the political science 
literature. First, citizens of contemporary democratic societies tend to be poorly informed about 
political issues.2 Second, one of the strategies citizens use to form political views, despite low 
levels of political knowledge, is to take cues from more knowledgeable elites or acquaintances.3 
The literature investigating the phenomenon of “cue taking” does not distinguish between political 
testimony and certain other forms of reliance on the views of others, but political testimony is 
certainly one example of cue taking. Given evidence that cue taking is a widely used strategy for 
coping with a serious problem of voter incompetence, it is important to know whether some forms 
of cue taking are problematic from a democratic point of view.  
                                               
1 This belief is not universally shared. Two recent book-length discussions of the ethics of 
political citizenship represent opposing views on this issue. Brennan sees no problem at all in 
voters deferring to those with better political judgment (2011, chapter 4); Beerbohm sees this as 
a problematic form of dependence (2012, 152-155). 
2 See, for example, Campbell et al. (1960), Converse (1964), and Delli Carpini and Keeter 
(1996). 
3 See Gilens and Murakawa (2002) for an overview of this literature.  
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 My discussion is indebted to the recent debate about the appropriateness of relying on 
moral testimony.4 I will point to various similarities and differences between political and moral 
testimony as I go along.  
 
 
2. Political Testimony 
My opening examples are only meant to illustrate the phenomenon of political testimony. In this 
section, I will explain the notion of political testimony at issue in this paper. My focus is on the 
appropriateness of relying on testimony for one’s political views, not on the appropriateness of 
providing such testimony. I will take a person S to rely on S1’s testimony with regard to S’s belief 
that p if and only if S’s belief that p is based on S1’s assertion that p.5 This definition refers to the 
epistemic basing relation, the character of which is subject to significant debate.6 My arguments 
                                               
4 See Jones (1999), Nickel (2001), Driver (2006), Hopkins (2007), Hills (2009), McGrath (2011), 
Sliwa (2012), Howell (2014), Lillehammer (2014), Crisp (2014), Enoch (2014), and Groll and 
Decker (2014). 
5 This biconditional simplifies matters in two ways. First, it only applies to beliefs that are based 
on the assertion of a single person. It could be amended to take the possibility of beliefs based on 
the assertions of several people into account, with the result that people could rely on the 
testimony of several persons with regard to a single belief. Second, it focusses on assertions 
rather than on a wider category of sayings. My arguments will not depend on any specific 
features of assertion as distinct from other ways of saying things.  
6 For a helpful overview, see Korcz (1997) 
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will be compatible with a variety of different interpretations of the basing relation, so I won’t here 
take a position in this debate. The following remarks may, however, help specify the phenomenon 
at issue in this article.  
 First, a person’s belief being based on another person’s assertion does not imply that the 
belief is justified by the assertion. If the asserter is unreliable, for example, her assertion may fail 
to provide sufficient justification, or any justification at all, to believe what is asserted. 
Nonetheless, another person’s belief can be based on that person’s assertion. Second, a person’s 
belief being based on another’s assertion depends on the current grounds for the belief, not on the 
origin of the belief. I might, for example, originally form my belief that the UK should remain in 
the EU on the basis of an expert’s assertion that it would be best if the UK were to remain, but I 
might subsequently acquire a set of non-testimonial grounds for my belief. In this case, I do not 
regard the belief to still be based on the expert’s assertion. Finally, I will take S’s belief that p 
being based on S1’s assertion that p to imply that S’s knowledge of S1’s assertion is a decisive 
component of S’s current grounds for believing that p: if it weren’t for S1’s assertion that p, S 
would not believe that p. This means that if S has sufficient other grounds to maintain her belief 
that p, in addition to S1’s assertion, then her belief does not count as being based on S1’s assertion. 
Further, S’s belief that p counts as based on S1’s assertion even if S has various non-testimonial 
reasons for believing that p, as long as S would not believe that p if it weren’t for S1’s assertion 
that p. 
 My discussion will focus on cases of reliance on political testimony, by which I will mean 
cases in which a person relies on testimony with regard to their belief that p, and this person is 
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asked to express their opinion about p as part of a formal democratic decision procedure.7 I will 
further limit my discussion to the political decision-making of ordinary citizens, excluding the the 
political decision-making of legislators, judges, and elected officials from consideration. 8  It 
follows from these limitations that my arguments do not apply to the wider domain of informal 
political opinion formation and decision-making. Whether to join a union, march in a 
demonstration, or sign a petition, for example, may be regarded as political decisions, but such 
decisions are not within the scope of my discussion. My focus is on the beliefs underlying citizens’ 
decision-making as part of formal democratic decision procedures, of which referenda and 
elections are paradigm examples.  
                                               
7 My discussion of political testimony differs from the literature on moral testimony here. In the 
literature on moral testimony, it is generally assumed that there is a distinctive moral subject 
matter, so that cases of reliance on moral testimony are simply cases in which the relevant belief 
has moral content. Political testimony, as I use the concept, is not specified in terms of the 
content of the beliefs involved, but in terms of the formal political decision procedures in which 
the subject is participating. In principle, the beliefs involved in political testimony could have 
any proposition as their content, as long as the proposition is made the target of a democratic 
decision procedure.  
8 A discussion of such political actors would bring a number of complications into play, having 
to do with various forms of delegation, the role of political parties, and so on. Whether reliance 
on political testimony is appropriate for a specific political actor will likely depend on the design 
of the democratic institutions in the context of which this person acts.  
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 For example, if I am asked to vote in a presidential election, I will take my vote for 
candidate X to reflect my belief that X is the best candidate, and I will rely on political testimony 
if and only if my belief is based on the assertion of another person that X is the best candidate. If 
I am voting in a referendum concerning whether to adopt policy Y, I will treat a vote for the policy 
to reflect the belief that it is better to adopt the policy, and I would rely on political testimony if 
and only if my belief is based on the assertion of another person that it is better to adopt the policy. 
In both cases, my reliance on the testimony of others counts as reliance on political testimony, not 
because there is something intrinsically political about the content of the beliefs involved, but 
because a formal democratic decision procedure asked me to express my belief about some 
proposition and my belief is based on the assertion of others that the proposition is true or false. 
By contrast, in the Expert Testimony case, my belief that the UK should remain in the EU is based 
on my beliefs about the likely effects of leaving and remaining, and I in turn rely on the testimony 
of others with regard to those beliefs. However, I do not rely on testimony with regard to the belief 
that the UK should remain, so I do not count as relying on political testimony in the Expert 
Testimony case. 
 In many cases, a single person will serve as a source of both political and non-political 
testimony. When deliberating about whether to vote for or against leaving the EU, I might read an 
opinion piece making the case for remaining. I might learn both about various considerations that 
weigh in favor of remaining, but also that the author judges that remaining is, all things considered, 
best. If I subsequently conclude that remaining is best and vote accordingly, then I rely on political 
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testimony if the author’s judgment that remaining is best is a decisive consideration for me. This 
can happen even if I am interested in, understand, and critically reflect on the author’s reasoning.9 
 My argument relies on a cognitivist interpretation of citizens’ voting behavior, according 
to which individual citizens express a political belief or judgment by voting. This interpretation of 
voting behavior should be seen as an element of a normative conception of democratic politics: in 
a well functioning democratic society, votes express political beliefs or judgments. I do not claim 
that actual voting behavior in existing democratic societies is best explained as issuing from 
political judgment or belief, rather than from citizens’ preferences or will. 10  Cognitivist 
interpretations of voting have been defended by a wide range of authors, and are presupposed in 
large areas of contemporary democratic theorizing, including much of the literature on deliberative 
democracy, and all of the literature that looks at democracy from the viewpoint of formal theories 
of judgment aggregation.11 Proponents of these views disagree about the content of the beliefs or 
                                               
9 My characterization of reliance on testimony differs from characterizations that focus on beliefs 
held solely because another person asserted the view (see, for example, McGrath 2011, p. 113), 
and from discussions that focus on beliefs of which any part of justification involves the 
testimony of others.  
10 See Cohen (1986) and Estlund (1990) for further discussion of the difference between an 
interpretation of voting as part of an explanatory theory and an interpretation of voting as part of 
a normative political conception. 
11 Rousseau’s The Social Contract (1997) is an important early source. Explicit defenses of 
cognitivist interpretations of voting can be found in Cohen (1986), Coleman and Ferejohn 
(1986), and Estlund (1990). The literature on democracy that interprets voting behavior as 
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judgments expressed by voting behavior: Wollheim (1962), for example, takes votes to express 
ought-judgments, Estlund (1990) beliefs about the common interest, Coleman and Ferejohn (1986) 
judgments about the collective ought, and so on. My arguments will apply without modification 
to cognitivist interpretations of voting generally. For ease of exposition, I will simply take a vote 
in an election to express the belief that the person voted for is the better candidate, and a vote for 
a policy in a referendum the belief that it is better to adopt the policy.  
 Of course, there is also a tradition in democratic thought which interprets voting behavior 
as expressing preferences, or other non-cognitive attitudes.12 On such views, issues of political 
testimony, as discussed in this paper, do not arise. People can recommend voting for a particular 
candidate or policy, but such recommendations would have to be construed as expressions of 
preference. To base one’s voting behavior on such recommendations would involve conforming 
one’s preference to the preferences of others; it would not involve basing one’s beliefs or 
judgments on the assertions of others.13 Preference-based conceptions of democracy may have 
                                               
expressing political judgments or beliefs is vast, and cannot properly be covered with a series of 
references. For three recent examples, see Beerbohm (2012), Landemore (2013),  and Brennan 
(2011).  
12 See, for example, Arrow (1951), Dahl (1956), and Riker (1988).  
13 One might, further, rely on the judgment of others to form beliefs about what one’s own 
political preferences are, or what they would be if one were better informed. Indeed, some of the 
cue-taking literature is presented in this way. The relevance of such information, and the 
relevance of voters’ beliefs about their own political preferences, presupposes a cognitivist 
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reason to object to certain forms of reliance on the preferences of others to form one’s political 
preferences, but those reasons would have to be different from the ones discussed in this paper.  
 
 
3. A Defense of Pessimism 
Following the literature on moral testimony, I will call the view that there is something wrong, or 
problematic, about relying on political testimony pessimism, and its negation optimism. In this 
section, I will ague for a pessimist view of political testimony.  
 Before I turn to the main argument, we need to distinguish between two kinds of 
pessimism.14 The first kind holds that whenever a citizen relies on political testimony, this citizen’s 
political deliberation fails to (fully) realize an ideal of citizenship. It is useful to think about this 
view in terms of the reasons citizens have not to rely on political testimony: 
 Pro Tanto Pessimism: each citizen has a pro tanto reason not to rely on political   
 testimony. 
The second kind of pessimism holds that citizens are required not to rely on political testimony: 
 Decisive Pessimism: each citizen has decisive reason not to rely on political testimony.  
According to Pro Tanto Pessimism, when a citizen relies on political testimony, it would, other 
things equal, be better if she did not rely on political testimony. Other things may not be equal, 
however, such that the pro tanto reason not to rely on political testimony is outweighed by other 
                                               
interpretation of voting according to which voting behavior expresses a judgment or belief about 
what one’s preferences are. 
14 Crisp (2014) emphasizes this distinction. 
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considerations and the citizen has, all things considered, most reason to rely on political testimony. 
According to Decisive Pessimism, citizens always have, all things considered, most reason not to 
rely on political testimony.  
 The relevant reasons should be understood as practical reasons, not epistemic reasons. 
Pessimism does not hold that we have epistemic reason to believe contrary to our evidence, nor 
that we have epistemic reason to ignore testimonial evidence when forming beliefs about political 
matters. Pessimism is consistent with the claim that we should proportion our beliefs to our 
evidence, including our testimonial evidence. Instead, pessimism is a claim about reason to act or 
refrain from acting in certain ways. When a person is asked to vote on a certain issue, and that 
person’s belief about the issue is based on political testimony, she has, broadly speaking, three 
options: (1) vote in accordance with her testimony-based belief; (2) investigate the political issue 
so as to arrive at a belief about the political issue which is not based on political testimony;15 or 
(3) retain her political belief based on political testimony, but vote in accordance with what she 
would believe if she would ignore the political testimony. If pessimism is true then she has reason, 
pro tanto or decisive, against (1). My defense of pessimism does not provide reasons that 
discriminate between (2) and (3). Given a cognitivist interpretation of voting, however, it seems 
to me that (3) comes at a significant cost: in voting for a candidate or policy, one expresses the 
judgment or belief that that candidate or policy is the best out of the available options, but one 
would not actually hold this belief or judgment. It is not part of this paper to argue that (3) is 
problematic, but it seems to me that (2) is the main alternative to reliance on political testimony. I 
will discuss cases in which (2) is costly or unavailable in section 4.  
                                               
15 This process of investigation may involve acquiring non-political expert testimony.  
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 A straightforward way to argue for a pessimist view would be by arguing that political 
testimony, unlike other forms of testimony, fails to confer epistemic justification on the resulting 
belief. One way to support such a view is to deny that the requisite kind of expertise exists in the 
political domain. The assertions of others do not provide us with genuine evidence for political  
propositions, and when we rely on political testimony in forming political beliefs, the resulting 
beliefs fail to be epistemically justified. For the purposes of this article, I will leave this skeptical 
view aside. I will assume that we can be justified in believing that another person is both reliable 
and trustworthy when it comes to a certain political question, and that the assertion of such a person 
can provide us with genuine evidence for political propositions.16 With these assumptions in place, 
what is left for pessimism to fault us for when we rely on political testimony? In the remainder of 
this section, I will argue for Pro Tanto Pessimism about political testimony; in section 4, I will 
extend the argument to a restricted form of Decisive Pessimism.  
 I will argue that reliance on political testimony conflicts with two important democratic 
values: the value of mutual justifiability, and the value of equal opportunity for political influence. 
In addition to these two values, reliance on political testimony may be in conflict with various 
other moral or ethical commitments citizens may have, such as ideals of political understanding, 
                                               
16 Williams (1995, 205) argues for the view that we should not rely on moral testimony because 
of the lack of moral expertise. For arguments against this view, see Jones (1999), Driver (2006), 
and Hopkins (2007). Given my characterization of political testimony, this type of argument for 
pessimism is even less plausible in the political domain than in the moral domain.  
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or certain conceptions of political virtue.17 Citizens of democratic societies are, of course, free to 
form such commitments and to try to live in accordance with them, but these commitments are not 
themselves part of the democratic ideal.18 Even if widespread reliance on political testimony 
undermines ideals of political understanding or virtue, this would not show that reliance on 
political testimony is problematic from a democratic point of view. My focus is on two distinctly 
democratic values because I am ultimately interested in whether democratic societies and their 
members have reason to be concerned about systematic forms of reliance on political testimony. 
 
 
3.1. Reciprocity in Political Justification 
I will start with the value of reciprocity in justification. A widely held view in contemporary 
political philosophy is that political decisions should be justifiable to all people subject to those 
decisions. This general idea has been discussed in terms of public reason, mutual justifiability, and 
                                               
17 I use these two examples because the main arguments for pessimism about moral testimony 
aim to show that reliance on moral testimony is in conflict with a valuable kind of moral 
understanding (Nickel 2001, Hills 2009) or with moral virtue (Howell 2014).  
18 This claim is subject to disagreement. I believe that values of political understanding or virtue 
are not fit for inclusion in an ideal of a democratic society characterized by reasonable pluralism, 
but others will disagree. My arguments do not depend on which side is right about this: if I am 
wrong, there could simply be additional grounds for my conclusions.  
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reciprocity in justification.19 The literature has given rise to a considerable variety of specific 
principles, but my discussion will focus on the following: 
 Reciprocity in Justification: when making political decisions, citizens should rely only on 
 considerations they can reasonably expect all reasonable citizens to accept.20 
The Reciprocity Principle restricts citizens in their political deliberation to what I will call public 
considerations.21 Paradigm examples of public considerations, according to defenders of principles 
of this kind, are distinctly political values inherent in the idea of a well-functioning liberal 
democracy: values of freedom, equality, fair social cooperation, the general welfare, public health, 
national defense, efficiency, equality of opportunity, and so on. The relevant expectations are 
normative expectations: we can normatively expect our fellow citizens to accept these values, even 
if we do not predict that they all do in fact accept these values. This means that the notion of 
reasonableness involved in the Reciprocity Principle refers to a substantial ideal of reasonable 
                                               
19 See Rawls (1993) and Larmore (1996) for canonical statements, and Gaus (2011) for a more 
recent account. 
20 On some views, principles of this kind only apply to political decisions about constitutional 
essentials and matters of basic justice. I see little basis for such restrictions on the demand of 
mutual justifiability, but if the Reciprocity Principle must be restricted in this way, the argument 
for pessimism provided in section 3.1 would only apply to the restricted set of political decisions.  
21 As stated, the principle is arguably too strong and should be made subject to a proviso 
allowing citizens to appeal to non-public considerations as long as they supply public 
considerations in due course (see Rawls, 1997). Whether such a proviso applies will not affect 
my discussion, so I will leave this issue aside. 
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citizenship, not to an intuitive idea of who counts as a reasonable person.22 Paradigm examples of 
non-public considerations are those issuing from comprehensive religious, moral, or philosophical 
doctrines, such as considerations of moral desert, freedom of the will, or the afterlife. Such 
considerations are subject to reasonable disagreement, so we cannot reasonably expect our fellow 
citizens to converge on the same view on these matters. The Reciprocity Principle itself is 
controversial, but a defense of the principle falls outside the scope of this article.23 
 Note that the Reciprocity Principle does not rule out reasonable disagreement about 
political outcomes. For example, if all citizens deliberate exclusively on the basis of public 
considerations when deciding whether to adopt a progressive tax policy, they may nonetheless 
reasonably disagree whether the policy should be adopted. They may weigh the relative 
importance of equality and efficiency differently, for instance. If a fair democratic procedure leads 
                                               
22 This leaves open what the precise content of political liberalism’s conception of 
reasonableness is. My argument is compatible with a variety of specifications of this content. In 
Leland and van Wietmarschen 2012, I provide an account and defense of political liberalism’s 
conception of reasonable citizenship.   
23 Some defenders of principles of reciprocity in political justification, such as Larmore (1996, 
1999) and Nussbaum (2011), seek to ground such principles in respect for persons. When 
citizens make political decisions, they exercise coercive force over their fellow citizens, and 
doing so on the basis of reasonably disputed considerations would be to disrespect one’s fellow 
citizens. Others, such as Ebels-Duggan (2010), Lister (2013), and Leland and van Wietmarschen 
(2017) argue that citizens ought to comply with the Reciprocity Principle because doing so 
realizes political values of civic friendship and joint rule.  
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to the adoption of the policy, then no violation of the Reciprocity Principle has occurred, even 
though the policy itself is subject to reasonable disagreement.24 
 Does the Reciprocity Principle rule out reliance on political testimony?25 When citizens 
vote in favor of candidate X or policy Y, I take them to express the belief that X is the better 
candidate or that Y should be adopted. When citizens rely on political testimony, the assertion of 
another person that X is the better candidate or that Y should be adopted forms an essential part of 
the basis of the belief expressed by their vote, so they rely on this assertion as a consideration that 
speaks in favor of their political belief. Of course, that the person made the assertion will often 
count as a public consideration. The question is whether this assertion can properly be taken to 
weigh in favor of a political decision; that is, whether the assertion, directly on the political 
question at hand, can be a consideration one can reasonably expect all reasonable citizens to accept 
as speaking in favor of a political decision.  
 Suppose I am voting whether a policy to ban racial profiling by the police should be 
adopted. My decision-making conforms to the Reciprocity Principle insofar as I rely on public 
                                               
24 This focus on the grounds of political decisions is common, but some public reason theorists, 
such as Gaus (2011), propose views that target the political decisions themselves. 
25 It should be clear that the principle applies to the type of political decision I’m interested in 
here: decisions in the context of formal democratic procedures such as voting for representatives 
or in referenda. The principle applies to all political decisions that authorize the use of political 
power, including decisions made by legislators and judges, but also by ordinary citizens. The 
principle is not meant to apply to political decisions made in non-formal contexts, such as 
decisions to protest, speak in public, join unions, and so on. 
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considerations. I may, for example, believe that racial profiling leads to an unfair limitation on the 
freedom of members of the targeted groups, and I may believe that the effects on crime are 
minimal. If, instead, I believe that racial profiling is unacceptable because it is incompatible with 
our equal creation in the image of God, and vote on this basis, then my decision-making would 
violate the Reciprocity Principle. If I rely on political testimony, then whatever other 
considerations I may take to speak for or against racial profiling, some person’s assertion that 
racial profiling should be banned is a decisive ground for my judgment; without my knowledge of 
that person’s assertion, I would not believe that adopting the ban is best. I may, for example, take 
Michelle Alexander’s assertion that racial profiling should be banned to be a decisive reason in 
favor of adopting the policy. The question is: should Alexander’s assertion be classified as a public 
or as a nonpublic consideration?  
 As before, skepticism about political expertise would be a straightforward basis for a 
pessimist view. Once again, I will set this view aside and assume that citizens can have good reason 
to believe that another person is trustworthy and reliable on a certain political issue, and that such 
a person’s assertion can provide genuine evidence for political propositions. One can have good 
reason to believe that Alexander is a highly informed, sincere, and trustworthy reasoner about the 
US justice system. If she asserts that a policy banning racial profiling should be adopted, I assume 
that this can give one evidence that such a policy should be adopted. These assumptions rule out 
skepticism about political expertise, but they do not answer our question. 
 The first step towards an answer is to observe that the questions democratic societies ask 
their citizens to answer through formal voting procedures are typically characterized by reasonable 
disagreement. In both elections and referenda, citizens usually disagree, and disagree reasonably, 
about which candidate is best and about which policies should be adopted. Moreover, this presence 
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of reasonable political disagreement is no accident: democratic voting procedures are costly, and 
it makes little sense to incur these costs when there is only one reasonable answer for citizens to 
give. This is not to say that it is impossible to hold elections or referenda in which there is only 
one reasonable candidate or policy, and in which all reasonable citizens can be expected to agree 
about this, but this would be an unusual scenario. 
 Second, the distinguishing feature of political testimony is that a person relies on another 
person’s assertion directly on the political issue. In the above example, I vote in favor of a ban on 
racial profiling, based on Michelle Alexander’s assertion that such a ban should be adopted. By 
contrast, if I rely on non-political testimony in determining my vote, I do not rely on anyone’s 
assertion directly on the political issue. Instead, I rely on the assertions of others to form beliefs 
about considerations I take to be relevant to the political decision, but I then draw my own political 
conclusion based, in part, on those beliefs. For example, when deciding whether to vote for to 
remain in the EU, I rely on the assertions of others to determine the likely consequences of 
remaining and leaving. I then form a judgment about whether remaining is best, based on these 
and other considerations.  
 It follows that in typical cases of political decision-making, when a voter relies on political 
testimony, she relies on the assertion of another person, the content of which is subject to 
reasonable disagreement. In the example, there is reasonable disagreement about whether a policy 
banning racial profiling should be adopted.26 If I vote in favor of such a policy, and my decision 
                                               
26 This might be controversial. If one believes that there is no reasonable disagreement about this 
issue, a different example can be inserted. My claim is not that reliance on political testimony 
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is based on Alexander’s assertion that racial profiling should be banned, then I am treating her 
assertion as a consideration in favor of my decision. Given reasonable political disagreement, there 
are people who reasonably believe that Alexander’s assertion is false. Those who reasonably 
believe that racial profiling should not be banned will also reasonably believe that Michelle 
Alexander is mistaken on this occasion and that her judgment, at least on this particular question, 
should not be trusted. Consequently, I cannot reasonably expect all reasonable citizens to accept 
that Alexander’s assertion speaks in favor of adopting the ban. As a result, the Reciprocity 
Principle rules out appeal to political testimony, at least in typical political decisions characterized 
by reasonable disagreement. 
 One objection to this argument is that I could not only have good reasons to believe that 
Alexander’s judgment is reliable and trustworthy, I could have public reasons to believe this. If 
that is the case, I can justify my reliance on her political judgment to my fellow citizens on public 
grounds. Perhaps we can all reasonably be expected to agree that being a professor of law, being 
a long-time scholar of race discrimination, and having litigated several class action discrimination 
cases counts in favor of Alexander’s reliability and trustworthiness. I do not deny that such 
considerations could count as public considerations. If the political question at hand would be 
whether to elect Alexander to public office, or whether to appoint her to a committee investigating 
race discrimination in the US justice system, these would be precisely the kind of considerations 
to which people could appropriately appeal when making their decisions. She could, in keeping 
with the Reciprocity Principle, be elected or appointed on the basis of such considerations, even 
                                               
conflicts with the Reciprocity Principle in all cases, but only in typical cases of political 
decision-making characterized by reasonable disagreement.  
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though there normally would be reasonable disagreement about whether she is the best candidate. 
However, the question at hand is not whether Alexander should be elected, but whether a ban on 
racial profiling should be adopted. This decision, like all political decisions, should be made on 
the basis of considerations that are beyond reasonable dispute. It is not beyond reasonable dispute 
that Alexander’s assertion that the ban should be adopted speaks in favor of the ban. The existence 
of public reasons for trusting her judgment on this issue does not change that fact.  
 None of this means that Michelle Alexander and others are not worth listening to when we 
are trying to decide whether to vote for or against a policy banning racial profiling. This is because 
she and others have much to say about racial profiling—about its consequences for racial 
inequality, its relation to mass incarceration, its effects on crime, and so on—beyond the bare 
assertion that it should be banned. When it comes to information of this kind, it is not unusual for 
there to be people that we can reasonably expect all citizens to agree are experts in the relevant 
area. The availability of publicly acceptable non-political expertise is not undermined by 
reasonable political disagreement in the way that the availability of publicly acceptable political 
expertise is. If there is reasonable disagreement about a political choice—as I claim there almost 
always is—then it follows that reliance on political testimony conflicts with the Reciprocity 
Principle; it does not follow that reliance on non-political expert testimony violates the principle. 
Note that I am not arguing that reliance on political testimony always violates the Reciprocity 
Principle, and that reliance on expert testimony never does. Instead, I have argued that reliance on 
political testimony violates the Reciprocity Principle whenever the political issue is subject to 
reasonable disagreement. By contrast, non-political expert testimony can satisfy the Reciprocity 
Principle, even when the political issue itself is subject to reasonable disagreement. This is the key 
asymmetry between political and non-political testimony defended in this section. There will 
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nonetheless be many cases in which we cannot reasonably expect all citizens to agree that some 
purported non-political expert is an expert, and this can happen even if the person is a genuine 
expert in the area. In such cases, reliance on the non-political expert testimony would violate the 
Reciprocity Principle in the same way as reliance on political testimony would.27 
 
 
3.2. Equal Opportunity for Political Influence 
I now turn to the second democratic value: the value of equal opportunity for political influence. 
Democratic decision procedures have been defended on a variety of grounds, one of which is that 
they provide all citizens with an equal opportunity to influence the character of their political 
association. I will argue that this value is in conflict with reliance on political testimony. 
 Kolodny (2014) provides a helpful specification of the value at issue. Influence can, first, 
be understood as decisiveness: one is decisive with regard to a particular political decision when, 
had one’s judgment or choice been different, the decision would have been different. Under 
majority rule, one would be decisive when and only when there is a tie or one is a member of a 
                                               
27 In the US especially, there has been a sustained effort in the past few decades by some groups 
to discredit scientific investigation as a source of a mutually acceptable body of knowledge. The 
view I defend here captures one way in which this is a genuinely worrying development: if 
various parties are sufficiently effective at spreading misinformation to effectively undermine 
well-established scientific findings as public considerations, this may limit the scope of political 
justification. Ultimately, matters will depend on how the concept of reasonableness is defined, 
something I cannot settle in this article.  
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majority by a single vote (2014, 320). Influence can also be understood as contributory influence: 
one has contributory influence in so far as one’s judgment or choice has weight in determining the 
political decision. I side with Kolodny in thinking that a democratic concern with equal political 
influence should be understood as a concern with contributory influence. To determine equality of 
contributory influence, Kolodny proposes the following: “by X-ing, I exercise equal contributory 
influence over a decision just when my X-ing has equal a priori chances of being decisive over 
the decision, that is, has equal a priori chances of being decisive on the assumption that no pattern 
of X-ing by others is more likely than any other pattern” (2014, 320-1). To explain a concern for 
an equal opportunity for political influence, rather than actual equality of political influence, it 
suffices for our purposes to say that when people freely decide not to vote in a democratic decision 
procedure, this should not count against the procedure.  
 Proper democratic decision procedures secure, or at least approximate, formal equality of 
opportunity for contributory political influence. Nationwide voting procedures provide each 
citizen with a single non-alienable vote that is accorded the same weight as every other vote. If we 
attend to the formal features of the decision procedure alone, each member has an equal 
opportunity to vote, and each voter has an equal a priori chance of being decisive over the decision. 
 Democratic decision-making is not just a matter of counting votes, and a person’s judgment 
can influence political outcomes in ways other than translation into a single vote. Prior to voting, 
citizens may engage in a wide range of activities that influence the ultimate political decision, 
primarily through affecting other citizen’s voting behavior. For example, citizens may offer one 
another reasons in favor of candidates or policy proposals in a process of deliberation, they may 
bribe or threaten one another, they may manipulate or deceive, or use reputation or fame to 
influence others. We may call this informal political influence. Being in a position to provide 
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political testimony that other citizens take to be authoritative provides one with an opportunity for 
such informal political influence. 
 Opportunities for informal political influence are not always distributed equally. People 
with greater wealth, social status, expertise, political skill, threat advantage, and so on, may have 
greater opportunity to influence the voting behavior of others in the direction of their own political 
judgment. In any sizable group of voters among which informal influence plays a role, 
opportunities for exerting such influence are unlikely to be equal. This is true for the political 
influence of political testimony as well: not every person’s assertion that candidate X or policy Y 
is the better choice carries the same weight in the decision-making process. The question is whether 
this makes political testimony problematic with regard to the value of equality of opportunity for 
political influence. 
 Not all differences in informal political influence are problematic. When some citizens 
have greater influence over political decisions because of manipulation, deception, threats, and 
bribes, this clearly is problematic. Whether increased influence due to wealth or social status is in 
tension with democratic equality is a matter of dispute.28 However, democratic theorists tend to 
agree that when people have greater informal influence over a political decision because they 
provide good reasons for their judgment, such that others find those reasons convincing and change 
their voting behavior, no problematic inequality in political power has been established. In fact, a 
situation in which “no force but that of the better argument is exercised” is sometimes argued to 
be the hallmark of good democratic deliberation.29 The question is: which differences in people’s 
                                               
28 For opposing views on this point, see, for example, Friedman (2002, 16-21) and Gilens (2012). 
29 Habermas (1975, 108). 
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opportunities for political influence conflict with the ideal of equality of opportunity for political 
influence, and which don’t? Or, what distinguishes proper from improper forms of informal 
political influence, and on what side of the distinction does political testimony belong? 
 I will follow the existing literature by distinguishing forms of influence that operate by way 
of the free and reasoned judgment of other voters, and forms of influence that don’t. For example, 
Brighouse and Fleurbaey write:  
 The criterion which distinguishes legitimate from illegitimate sources of unequal   
 influence is just this: those which are legitimate are those where the influence of the  
 person influencing the process of political deliberation is transformed into the authentic  
 influence of the audience at the voting stage, because the voter has accepted publicly  
 articulated reasons on the basis of rational reflection (2010, 147).30 
On their view, when someone exercises greater political influence than others by providing good 
reasons and good evidence for their views, then this influence “enters the formal decision-making 
process not as their own power, but as that of voters they have persuaded” (2010, 146). Similarly, 
Kolodny argues that judgment-independent inequalities in opportunity for informal influence may 
be problematic, but that judgment-dependent inequalities are not (2014, 334). The reason is that if 
a person has greater political influence because a group of others judge her to have provided good 
reasons to vote a certain way, then that person has greater political influence as a result of those 
others exercising their equal opportunity to influence the political decision. 
 It may seem that reliance on political testimony should count as judgment-dependent, and 
therefore consistent with equal opportunity for political influence, because in typical cases, when 
                                               
30 see also Brighouse (1996, 125-27).  
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a voter relies on political testimony, she takes the assertion of another person to provide her with 
a reason to vote in favor of a candidate or policy. Unlike fraudulent vote counting or subliminal 
manipulation, political testimony operates through the deliberation process of the target. 
Manipulation may cause a person to vote a certain way, and fraud simply changes a person’s vote 
independently of the voter’s agency, but political testimony influences a voter’s behavior by 
providing her with reasons. This, however, cannot suffice to show that political testimony is 
consistent with equal opportunity for political influence: lies, bribes, and threats also provide me 
with reasons for voting for policies or candidates, and those are clearly unacceptable forms of 
political influence.31 
 That S’s political influence operates by providing me with a reason to vote for or against a 
candidate or policy does not suffice for S’s political power to count as my political power. Instead, 
I propose that my process of political deliberation transforms S’s political influence into my 
political influence only if, as a result of my deliberation, S’s influencing actions or assertions do 
                                               
31 One could rule out bribes and threats by demanding that legitimate political influence provides 
reasons of the right kind. Successful bribes and threats provide the target with reasons to vote in 
favor of a certain candidate or policy, but these are reasons that do not provide grounds for 
believing that the candidate or policy is the better one. A process of reasoning transforms 
political influence into the political influence of the voter, we could say, only if the actions of the 
influencer are taken as reasons for thinking that candidate X or policy Y is best. This strategy 
might work for bribes and threats, but it would not rule out other clearly problematic kinds of 
political influence such as deception and certain forms of manipulation. 
 
   26 
not themselves constitute reasons for my political belief.32 Non-political expert testimony provides 
an example of this. If I’m making up my mind about the EU membership of the UK, and I seek 
out expert testimony about the effects of remaining and leaving, others provide me with 
information about the likely effects of these outcomes on economic stability, immigration, the 
border with Ireland, food safety, and so on. When I rely on their expert testimony in determining 
my vote, this provides the experts with increased political influence. However, to determine my 
vote, I take their information and reflect on whether this provides me with reasons for or against 
leaving. Once I conclude that remaining is, all things considered, best, my reasons for this 
judgment are that the remaining would protect economic stability, lead to a better immigration 
policy, avoid a problematic border situation, or better guarantee food safety. The experts on whom 
I rely act as messengers of relevant information, but their judgments are not themselves reasons 
for voting one way or the other. I could have received the same information from any number of 
other sources. This, I propose, is an instance of the kind of process of political deliberation 
                                               
32 I am here treating S’s actions or assertions as candidate reasons for belief. On some views, 
only my beliefs about S’s actions or assertions could constitute reasons for belief, not those 
actions or assertions themselves. On the alternative view, my proposal would read: my process of 
political deliberation transforms S’s political influence into my political influence only if, as a 
result of my deliberation, my beliefs about S’s influencing actions or assertions do not 
themselves constitute reasons for my political belief.  
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Fleurbaey and Brighouse, and Kolodny have in mind: my reasoning process transforms the 
political influence of the expert into my own political influence.33 
 When I rely on political testimony, I also engage in a process of deliberation about which 
policies or candidates are best. However, the crucial difference with expert testimony is that when 
I rely on political testimony, my ultimate political judgment is based on the political judgment of 
another person. By definition, when my judgment that the UK should remain in the EU relies on 
political testimony, someone else’s assertion that the UK should remain forms an essential part of 
the reasons for my judgment. 34  Whatever other considerations I take to speak in favor of 
remaining, these are not sufficient, by my own lights, to judge that the UK should remain. So, in 
the case of reliance on political testimony, my process of political deliberation does not lead to a 
                                               
33 This proposal, as well as the views of Brighouse and Fleurbaey, and Kolodny, may seem 
paradoxical. After all, the well-informed, persuasive, and trustworthy non-political expert has 
greater opportunity for political influence than others. Unless we are willing to object to free 
political discussion and debate, it seems that we should reject ideals of equality of opportunity 
for political influence. The proposed view should be read, however, not as denying that 
influential experts have greater influence, but as specifying which kinds of opportunities for 
political influence the ideal seeks to equalize.  
34 Here, again, I am assuming that people’s assertions are candidate reasons for belief. If we 
adopt the view that my beliefs about other people’s assertions, rather than those assertions, 
constitute reasons for belief, my claim would be that when I rely on political testimony, my 
belief that someone else asserted that the UK should remain forms an essential part of the 
reasons for my political judgment.  
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situation in which the influencing actions or assertions of others do not constitute reasons for my 
political belief. Political testifiers are not mere messengers of relevant information that the 
receivers could have obtained from other sources as well. Instead, the judgments of political 
testifiers influence the political decisions of those who rely on them by constituting grounds for 
those decisions. Political testifiers have greater influence over the political outcome by virtue of 
my reliance on their judgment, and we cannot properly count this as my political influence because 
their assertions are essential components of the grounds of my political belief. I conclude that 
political testimony is in conflict with the value of equality of opportunity for political influence.35 
 One may object that my argument ignores an important way in which people who rely on 
political testimony may employ their own deliberative capacities. When citizens rely on political 
testimony, they need not blindly take another person’s political judgment to be a reason to vote 
one way or the other, they may have good reasons to trust that person’s political judgment, and 
they may critically examine and reflect on those reasons. However, one might also exercise one’s 
capacities for critical reflection and deliberation in considering whether and how to respond to 
threats, bribes, lies, and manipulation. The exercise of our reasoning capacities does not suffice to 
render such sources of influence compatible with the ideal of equal opportunity for political 
                                               
35 Another way to see the problem is to consider what happens when our fellow citizens ask us to 
justify our political decision to them. When we rely on political testimony, we ultimately have to 
admit that we made our decision, and so exercised political power over our fellow citizens, based 
on another person’s judgment that it was the right decision to make. This may be perfectly 
acceptable when there is a justified authority structure or system of delegation, but it would be in 
conflict with each citizen having an equal say in the decision.  
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influence; on my view it also does not suffice to render reliance on political testimony compatible 
with this ideal. The reason, again, is that however much we examine our sources, when we rely on 
political testimony, the political judgment of another remains a decisive element of the grounds 
for our decision.36 
  
 
4. Answering Questions Together or Alone 
                                               
36 Given my understanding of reliance on political testimony, citizens may not always be in a 
position to know whether they rely on political testimony with respect to a given political belief. 
Citizens can reflect on whether their political beliefs are sufficiently supported by non-
testimonial considerations, but such reflection will not always yield a determinate or correct 
answer. Consequently, my view implies that we are not always in a position to know whether our 
own political deliberation conforms to the Reciprocity Principle, and whether we provide others 
with undue opportunities for political influence. This may be concerning, especially if one thinks 
that it must be possible for the norms of democratic citizenship to be seen to be satisfied. I 
acknowledge that this may be a cost of the view, but it is not a cost that is uniquely associated 
with criticisms of political testimony. The Reciprocity Principle asks citizens not to rely on their 
religious, moral, and philosophical convictions in their political deliberation, and citizens will 
not always be in a position to know whether they conform to this demand. Similarly, citizens will 
not always know whether they conform to principles opposing various forms of informal 
political influence. 
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The arguments of the previous section support Pro Tanto Pessimism about political testimony. 
Reliance on political testimony conflicts with reciprocity in justification 37  and with equal 
opportunity for political influence. Assuming that these two ideals represent genuine democratic 
values, citizens fall short of an ideal of democratic citizenship when they rely on political 
testimony, and they have a pro tanto reason not to rely on political testimony The question of this 
section is whether the argument can be extended to support Decisive Pessimism about political 
testimony. 
 Sliwa’s (2012) and Enoch’s (2014) defenses of moral testimony point to the main obstacle 
to such an extension: given that people are subject to various cognitive and moral limitations, 
reliance on testimony can realize values that compete with those that would be realized by relying 
on one’s own judgment. In the case of moral testimony, the main competing value is the value of 
doing the right thing.38 Given that people are imperfectly informed and imperfect reasoners, and 
given that people’s moral judgment can be compromised by bias or self-interest, people frequently 
run a risk of making a wrong decision when faced with a moral choice. Reliance on moral 
testimony could significantly reduce this risk. Even if there are certain values associated with 
relying on one’s own moral judgment, such as the value of moral understanding or moral virtue, it 
                                               
37 When the political decision is characterized by reasonable disagreement.  
38 I am using the informal language of “doing the right thing” in order not to suggest a specific 
account of right action. There may be views of right action according to which whether one acts 
rightly depends on the reasons for which one acts, and according to which moral testimony 
cannot provide the appropriate kind of reasons. On such a view, Sliwa’s and Enoch’s claims 
would be incorrect.  
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doesn’t seem that these values always outweigh the value of doing the right thing. This line of 
argumentation shows, I believe, that Decisive Pessimism about moral testimony is incorrect.39  
 This objection to Decisive Pessimism transfers to the political domain. In the case of 
political testimony, we can think of the competing value as the value of making substantially just 
political decisions.40 The problem is especially clear in cases where citizens are presented with 
detailed policy questions. As an example, take California’s 1994 proposition 184, which supported 
“three strikes” sentencing laws. On the assumption that the resulting laws are substantially unjust, 
                                               
39 It does not show, however, that Pro Tanto Pessimism about moral testimony is incorrect. 
Some of the main defenses of pessimism, such as Howell’s (2014) and Crisp’s (2014), are 
explicitly aimed at Pro Tanto Pessimism rather than Decisive Pessimism. The discussions of 
Hills (2009) and Nickel (2001) are less explicit about this point, but they also suggest a Pro 
Tanto reading of pessimism. These views are largely untouched by this line of argument. 
40 In some cases, none or all of the options may be substantially unjust. This would not 
undermine the argument here: the argument against Decisive Pessimism only needs there to be 
some cases in which the values associated with relying on one’s own judgment competes with 
the value of justice. Moreover, a similar argument can be formulated without appeal to the value 
of justice, as long as there are better or worse ways of deciding the issue. For example, some 
options may be more reasonable than others. The argument could even be restated in terms of 
competing values that do not refer to a standard of betterness applied to outcomes. For example, 
one might think that it is important for citizens to vote in accordance with what their informed 
political preferences would be. Reliance on political testimony may enable citizens to do so even 
when it is impossible or too costly for citizens to acquire the relevant information. 
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citizens who do not have the time to carefully investigate the proposition, or lack the requisite 
knowledge about the justice system in general, or who are biased in certain ways, could run a 
significant risk of supporting an unjust political decision. Since we are not perfectly informed, 
perfectly rational, unbiased, and disinterested reasoners about political issues, we often run some 
risk of making an unjust political decision. In certain cases, we might be able to significantly 
reduce this risk by relying on political testimony.41 The arguments of the previous section don’t 
establish that in such cases the values of reciprocity in justification and equal opportunity for 
political influence outweigh the value of justice. I take this to show that Decisive Pessimism is not 
generally correct.  
 Nonetheless, a crucial asymmetry between moral and political testimony allows for a 
defense of a restricted version of Decisive Pessimism about political testimony. In many cases, we 
ultimately have to answer various moral questions as individuals. Sometimes we have to make up 
our moral minds as a family, or group of friends, or other association, but we often have to make 
our own moral decisions. We can ask others for advice or for their judgment, but we have to decide 
for ourselves what career to pursue, whether or not to procreate, whether or not to opt for 
euthanasia, and so on. Furthermore, we have only limited control over which moral questions we 
will have to answer. Since the world does not ensure that the moral questions we are confronted 
with conform to our moral and intellectual abilities, we inevitably end up with cases in which 
                                               
41 As in the case of moral testimony, one might deny this claim if one holds that whether a 
decision is unjust depends on the motivating reasons for the decision, and that political decisions 
cannot provide motivating reasons that can produce a just decision. On such views, 
considerations of justice would not provide reasons to rely on political testimony.  
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answering our moral questions without relying on moral testimony produces a significant risk of 
doing the wrong thing.  
 By contrast, in a democracy, we ultimately have to answer our political questions together, 
as citizens of a political society. We have to decide what our economic policy should look like, 
whether to invest in carbon sequestration, and so on, but that does not imply that we each have to 
decide these matters. Which citizens are asked which political questions is itself a matter of 
political choice. In a society that emphasizes direct democracy, the citizenry as a whole is regularly 
asked to decide particular policy questions; in a society that emphasizes representative democracy, 
citizens may only be asked who should occupy various positions of political authority, leaving 
detailed policy questions to those elected.42 Though a democratic society does not control which 
political questions it has to answer, a democratic society does control which particular citizens are 
asked to answer which political questions. This means that in the political case, unlike the moral 
case, we can make use of an institutional structure to divide our decision-making labor, which 
allows us to manage our individual cognitive and moral limitations.  
 With the conclusions of the previous section in mind, I propose the following principle: 
 Reasonable Demands: a democratic society has pro tanto reason formally to ask its  
 citizens only questions that they are able to answer without reliance on political   
 testimony, and without incurring undue costs. 
The relevant costs are the costs of gathering, interpreting, and evaluating the information necessary 
to come to an answer. The argument for Reasonable Demands is simply that reliance on political 
                                               
42 And there are various other decision-making mechanisms that democracies can use, such as 
lotteries and deliberative polls.  
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testimony undermines the democratic values of reciprocity in justification and equal opportunity 
for political influence. Assuming that asking citizens political questions they are unable to answer 
by themselves increases their reliance on political testimony, a democratic society has pro tanto 
reason not to ask its citizens such questions. These reasons need not be decisive: there may be 
various reasons to pose certain questions to citizens even if (some of) those citizens are only able 
to decide the matter by reliance on political testimony.43  
 The principle of Reasonable Demands allows us to maintain a restricted version of Decisive 
Pessimism about political testimony: when a citizen is formally asked a political question that he 
or she is able to answer without recourse to political testimony, and without incurring undue costs, 
then he or she ought not rely on political testimony when answering that question. In other words, 
when formally asked a question in keeping with the principle of Reasonable Demands, a citizen 
has decisive reason not to rely on political testimony when answering it. This principle is not 
undermined by limitations of information, rationality and bias in the way that an unrestricted 
Decisive Pessimism is: if citizens are not sufficiently informed, rational, or unbiased to come to 
an informed and competent judgment about some question, or can only do so at significant cost, 
then the principle does not demand that they refrain from appeal to political testimony.  
                                               
43 For example, for certain political questions there might be no particular subgroup of citizens 
such that they can answer the question without recourse to political testimony, and where it is 
democratically acceptable that they make the decision. In cases like that, citizens who cannot 
reasonably be asked to answer the question without recourse to political testimony may have to 
be asked to answer the question nonetheless.  
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 My overall conclusion concerning the acceptability of reliance on political testimony is 
captured by the following three principles: 
 1. Pro-Tanto Pessimism: citizens have a pro tanto reason not to rely on political   
 testimony. 
 2. Reasonable Demands: a democratic society has pro tanto reason to formally ask its  
 citizens only questions that they are able to answer without reliance on political   
 testimony, and without incurring undue costs. 
 3. Restricted Decisive Pessimism: when a citizen is formally asked a political   
 question that he or she is able to answer without recourse to political testimony, and  
 without incurring undue costs, then he or she has decisive reason not to rely on political  
 testimony. 
I have left open what would count as undue costs in this context. Different conceptions of 
democracy will come to very different conclusions on this point, depending on two key variables. 
The first is how much active investigation, deliberation, and participation a political society can 
properly expect of its citizens. Participatory conceptions of democracy may demand a lot; 
minimalist conceptions, such as Schumpeter’s (1942) competitive conception, demand much less. 
The second variable concerns what a democratic theory regards as a proper answer to a political 
question. On some views, a citizen properly votes for a candidate or policy only if the citizen 
justifiably believes that the candidate or policy is at least as good as the other available options. 
According to certain conceptions of democracy, proper voting behavior merely requires that the 
citizen has a better than random chance of selecting the better candidate or policy. Depending on 
its position on these two variables, conceptions of democracy may come to dramatically different 
conclusions about the range of questions citizens are able to answer without reliance on political 
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testimony, and without undue costs. As long as a conception of democracy endorses the values of 
equal opportunity for political influence and reciprocity in justification, my arguments are 
compatible with a wide range of positions on these two variables. Where a conception of 
democracy falls on these variables will make it easier or harder to satisfy the three principles I 
defend, but that does not undermine the principles themselves.  
 
 
5. Elitism 
By way of conclusion, I discuss a likely objection to the argument of this paper: that my 
conclusions are unacceptably elitist. My argument suggests that a democratic society has reason 
not to put detailed or complicated policy questions to the electorate, leaving those questions to be 
decided by specialized elites. My arguments start from democratic values of reciprocity in 
justification and equal opportunity for political influence, but the conclusions may seem anti-
democratic. 
 The first part of my response is that no political society can avoid answering the question 
of who is to make which political decisions. Moreover, I can think of no viable political system 
that would pose each and every political question to the entire electorate. For this reason, it seems 
that my claim that we have some reason not to pose certain questions to all citizens is not enough 
to make my view objectionably elitist. 
 Second, we should keep in mind that my arguments concern formal democratic decision 
procedures, such as voting procedures. My arguments are fully consistent with the view that 
democratic politics should be transparent, and that citizens should be free to discuss all political 
questions against a background of a free press and free expression generally. The claim that it 
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would be bad to decide detailed economic policy by nationwide referendum does not mean that 
the details of economic policy should be decided behind closed doors. Moreover, decision 
procedures that do not involve all citizens come in many forms, some more elitist in character than 
others. It is one thing to let a relatively stable ruling class determine political outcomes, but quite 
another to let elected members of a legislative body or a random sample of the general population 
deliberate and decide political issues.44 
 Third, I have only argued that there are pro tanto reasons not to ask citizens questions that 
they cannot reasonably be expected to answer without recourse to political testimony. These 
reasons may be outweighed by other considerations, including considerations having to do with 
elitism: if it is unacceptable to leave a particular question up to a better informed elite, then this 
may justify putting the question to the citizenry even if many citizens would have to rely on 
political testimony to answer it. 
 Fourth, the set of questions citizens are able to answer without relying on political 
testimony is not fixed. Suppose that concerns about elitism give us reason to let a wide range of 
political questions, including complex policy proposals, be decided by the general electorate. My 
arguments are not opposed to this, nor does my view imply that the value of anti-elitism is 
necessarily at odds with the values of reciprocity in justification and equal opportunity for political 
influence. Instead, my view implies that a political society, if it wants to have a significant range 
of political questions be decided by the general electorate, has reason to put its citizens in a position 
to properly answer those questions. There are all kinds of ways in which a political society may 
                                               
44 For discussions of various proposals to involve randomly selected groups of citizens in 
democratic decision-making, see Fishkin (2009) and Guerrero (2014). 
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expand what it can reasonably expect of citizens: it may, for instance, provide good and accessible 
information, educational programs, or foster a culture of political discussion. 
 Finally, it should be clear that my arguments do not support disenfranchising or otherwise 
excluding groups from democratic decision-making on grounds of their inability to answer certain 
political questions. The democratic values of reciprocity in justification and equal opportunity for 
political influence, which form the basis of my discussion, are in conflict with such proposals. The 
question of which kind of democratic procedure should be used to make a particular political 
decision should not be confused with the question of whether we should use a democratic or an 
undemocratic procedure.  
 
 
References 
Arrow KJ (1951) Social Choice and Individual Values. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Beerbohm E (2012) In Our Name, The Ethics of Democracy. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. 
Brennan J (2011) The Ethics of Voting. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Brighouse H (1996) Egalitarianism and Equal Availability of Political Influence. The Journal of 
Political Philosophy 4 (2): 118-141. 
Brighouse H and Fleurbaey M (2010) Democracy and Proportionality. The Journal of Political 
Philosophy 18 (2): 137-155. 
Campbell A, Converse PE, Miller WE and Stokes DE (1960) The American Voter. Chicago: 
Chicago University Press.  
Cohen JC (1986) An Epistemic Conception of Democracy. Ethics 97 (1): 26-38. 
   39 
Coleman J and Ferejohn J. (1986) Democracy and Social Choice. Ethics 97 (1): 6-25.  
Converse PE (1964) The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics. In: Apter DE (ed) Ideology 
and Discontent. New York: Free Press, 206-261  
Crisp R (2014) Moral Testimony Pessimism: A Defense. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 
Supplementary Volume 88: 129-143. 
Dahl R (1956) A Preface to Democratic Theory. Chicago: Chicago University Press.  
Delli Carpini MX and Keeter S (1996) What Americans Know about Politics and Why it Matters. 
New Haven: Yale University Press.  
Driver J (2006) Autonomy and the Asymmetry Problem for Moral Expertise. Philosophical 
Studies 128: 619-644. 
Ebels-Duggan K (2010) The Beginning of Political Community: Politics in the Face of 
Disagreement. The Philosophical Quarterly 60 (2): 50-71. 
Enoch D (2014) A Defense of Moral Deference. The Journal of Philosophy 111 (5): 1-30. 
Estlund D (1990) Democracy Without Preference. The Philosophical Review 99 (3): 397-423. 
Estlund D (2009) Democratic Authority, A Philosophical Framework. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
Fishkin J (2009) When the People Speak. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Friedman M (2002) Capitalism and Freedom. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Gaus G (2011) The Order of Public Reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Gilens M (2012) Affluence and Influence. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Gilens M and Murakawa N (2002) “Elite Cues and Political Decision Making.” Political 
Decision Making, Deliberation, and Participation 6: 15-49. 
   40 
Groll D and Decker J (2014) Moral Testimony: One of These Things is Just Like the Others. 
Analytic Philosophy 55 (1): 54-74. 
Guerrero A (2014) Against Elections: The Lottocratic Alternative. Philosophy and Public Affairs 
42: 135-178. 
Habermas J (1975) The Legitimation Crisis of Late Capitalism. Boston: Boston Press. 
Hills A (2009) Moral Testimony and Moral Epistemology. Ethics 120: 94-127. 
Hopkins R (2007) What is Wrong with Moral Testimony? Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 74 (3): 611-634. 
Howell RJ (2014) Google Morals, Virtue, and the Asymmetry of Deference. Noûs 48 (3): 389-
415. 
Jones K (1999) Second-Hand Moral Knowledge. The Journal of Philosophy 96 (2): 55-78. 
Kolers A (2005) Justice and the Politics of Deference. The Journal of Political Philosophy 13 
(2): 153-173. 
Kolodny N (2014) Rule Over None II: Social Equality and the Justification of Democracy. 
Philosophy and Public Affairs 42 (2): 287-336. 
Korcz K (1997) Recent Work on the Basing Relation. American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (2): 
171-191. 
Landemore H (2013) Democratic Reason. Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
Larmore C (1996) The Morals of Modernity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Larmore C (1999) The Moral Basis of Political Liberalism. The Journal of Philosophy 96 (12): 
599-625. 
Leland RJ and van Wietmarschen H (2012) Reasonableness, Intellectual Modesty, and 
Reciprocity in Political Justification. Ethics 122 (4): 721-747. 
   41 
Leland RJ and van Wietmarschen H (2017) Political Liberalism and Political Community. 
Journal of Moral Philosophy 12 (2): 142-167. 
Lillehammer H (2014) Moral Testimony, Moral Virtue, and the Value of Autonomy. 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 88: 111-127. 
Lister A (2013) Public Reason and Political Community. London: Bloomsbury Publishing.  
McGrath S (2011) Skepticism about Moral Expertise and a Puzzle for Moral Realism. The 
Journal of Philosophy 108 (3): 111-137. 
Nickel P (2001) Moral Testimony and its Authority. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4: 253-
266. 
Nussbaum MC (2011) Perfectionist Liberalism and Political Liberalism. Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 39: 3-45. 
Rawls J (1993) Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Rawls J (1997) The Idea of Public Reason Revisited. The University of Chicago Law Review 64 
(3): 765-807. 
Riker WH (1988) Liberalism Against Populism. Long Grove: Waveland Press. 
Rousseau JJ (1997) The Social Contract. In Gourevitch V (ed): The Social Contract and Other 
Later Political Writings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Schumpeter JA (1942) Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. New York: Harper & Brothers. 
Sliwa P (2012) In Defense of Moral testimony. Philosophical Studies 158: 175-195. 
Williams BAO (1995) Making Sense of Humanity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Wollheim R (1962) A Paradox in the Theory of Democracy. In Fishkin and Laslett (eds): 
Philosophy, Politics and Society. Basil Blackwell, 71-87.  
 
   42 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I’m grateful to Michael Bratman, Amanda Greene, Krista Lawlor, RJ Leland, Anna-Sara 
Malmgren, Sara Mrsny, Véronique Munoz-Dardé and workshop participants at Yale University 
for helpful discussion of the arguments of this article, to two anonymous referees and one non-
anonymous editor (Andrew Williams) for this journal for their written comments, and to Lauren 
van Wietmarschen for her proofreading. This article was written while I was a visiting assistant 
professor at Stanford University, and this was a while ago. My apologies if you belong in these 
acknowledgements but are not there.  
s 
ABOUT THE AUTHOR 
Han van Wietmarschen is a lecturer in the Philosophy Department at University College London.  
